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Response
David A. Tallman
I would like to thank Macalester College and especially Dr. Ahmed
Samatar for inviting me to speak. The International Roundtable is a
remarkable tradition in which I am proud to participate. Unfortunately, I don’t have the economic or political science background to
engage Dr. Mokyr in a sophisticated debate on economic principles.
Instead, coming from a legal background, I would like to discuss two
policy implications of Mokyr’s view of the interplay of technology and
institutions. First, I address the need to create effective institutions for
the lateral transfer of technology between nations. Second, I argue that
we must tailor domestic institutions when necessary so that they can
impede the dissemination of the most dangerous technologies of the
future.
*****
Mokyr argues that technological knowledge is a public good. The use
of technology increases productivity and economic output. Consequently, a nation’s relative economic power is determined by its ability
to exploit technological change. According to his argument, the difference between Germany and Zimbabwe is that Germany’s institutional
framework encourages scientific innovation and the relatively free dissemination of technology from the producers of technology to those
who can take economic advantage of it whereas Zimbabwe does not.
Institutions are complex phenomena, shaped by powerful economic
forces, culture, tradition, and social necessity. Today, however, I focus
on institutions as creatures of law. The challenge for policymakers who
wish to close the gap between the world’s richest and poorest nations
is to use law to develop institutions that encourage the dissemination
of useful technical knowledge. Mokyr suggests that Western institutions are more amenable to economic growth than many non-Western
ones. He writes that it is easier for countries such as Pakistan to import
Western nuclear technology than to import economically efficient
Western institutions. However, merely importing Western institutions
into the developing world, even if appropriate, is not enough to narrow the divide. Much of the developing world simply lacks the infrastructure, in terms of both physical and human capital, to take
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advantage of the most advanced modern technology. For example, the
few paved roads in the Democratic Republic of Congo are almost
entirely limited to Kinshasa, the capital city.1 Even with Western institutions, such a nation cannot hope to develop the capacity to compete
—or even catch up—in an information economy that requires substantial infrastructural support.2
Efficient domestic institutions need to be supplemented by international institutions that encourage the lateral transfer of technology and
technological knowledge among nations. Barriers to the spread of technical knowledge need to be reduced just as do barriers to trade in
goods and services.
Both Western and non-Western countries have long recognized the
need for the developing world to establish a sound and viable technological base. However, unsurprisingly, they have differed about the
best way to achieve this goal. In the last few decades, the debate has
focused on technology transfer and intellectual property rights.
Because multinational enterprises produce and organize the use of
technology across national borders, such corporations are among the
most promising vehicles for the international dissemination of technology. Developing countries have tried to wring what technology they
can from their investment relations with foreign corporations through
a variety of methods, including compulsory licensing schemes, requiring the management in a foreign direct investment (FDI) project to
consist of local labor, and encouraging FDI projects to provide for the
eventual transfer of physical facilities once the foreign corporation has
recouped its investment. Some countries implemented laws providing
for government screening of technology transfer transactions to ensure
that the transferor does not abuse its superior bargaining position. For
example, several Latin American countries created the Andean Foreign Investment Code in 1969.3 The code provided for government
review of FDI contracts for overly restrictive clauses on the use and
reproduction of technology.4 The governments had the power to nullify the transaction if it was found to be abusive.5
These methods were largely ineffective, precisely because multinational corporations possess superior bargaining power. Those countries that are most “investor friendly” attract the most investment.
Compulsory licensing laws and other methods designed to divest a
corporation of its intellectual property have proven especially controversial. Developing nations saw these methods as valuable tools for
creating a technological base (or they were responding to crises) while
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Western nations considered them predatory schemes that undermined
robust international property protection. The United Nations
attempted to reach a compromise, embodied in a multilateral Transfer
of Technology Treaty. Unfortunately, that process stalled in the mid1980s, with the developed nations and the developing nations (represented by the Group of 77) unable to reach an agreement.6
The Western world now appears to have won the point. The World
Trade Organization’s TRIPS agreement requires all contracting parties
to implement strong intellectual property protections.7 While the preamble to the agreement recognizes the need of least-developed members for “maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws
and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and viable
technological base,”8 in practice, little leeway is given. While developing and least-developed nations have relaxed implementation requirements, strong patent protection systems are required.
This is fundamentally a positive development. As Mokyr points out,
while intellectual property protection is a barrier to the dissemination
of technology, it is necessary to preserve the incentive to innovate. A
country with weak or predatory international property rights laws
probably would not receive many technology transfer opportunities in
the first place.
Nevertheless, creating international institutions that encourage the
development and transfer of technology to the developing world
remains an important goal. What might such institutions look like?
Mokyr offers a suggestion when he speaks of the channels through
which efficient domestic institutions encourage technology. He writes
of institutions that set research agendas and encourage resource allocation, access to new technological knowledge, incentives for innovation,
and the free diffusion of technology.
Lateral institutions might operate along similar lines. Private or
public institutions could be created to fund research and development
programs in the Third World. Since technology is applied knowledge,
education is key. Methods to fight “brain drain” should be implemented. Grants should be given to individuals in the Third World for
technical training abroad at beneficial terms, tied to a commitment for
the individual to return to work in his or her home country for a
period of time. Such programs could be coupled with microloans for
in-country education.9
At the same time, there should be efforts to reform relations
between multinationals and developing states. This could entail the

69

Macalester International

Vol. 13

creation of model FDI contracts or codes of conduct for foreign direct
investment that might alleviate the concerns each side has about the
motivations and behavior of the other, and thus facilitate FDI. International institutions should also encourage internal institutional reform
of the kind Mokyr suggests. However, reform should be encouraged in
as constructive and noncoercive a way as possible. IMF structural
adjustment programs are a blunt instrument, to say the least. The
propagation of model intellectual property regimes is one possibility
that may encourage such constructive reform. In addition, strong legal
systems should be created to eliminate corruption and encourage the
efficient allocation of resources.
In sum, Mokyr may be right that domestic institutional reform is
necessary in order to take advantage of the benefits of technology. But
international institutional reform is equally important. We need to
rethink the ways in which we encourage both structural reform and
technology transfer.
*****
Having just argued that we must create institutions that encourage the
spread of technical knowledge, my second point might seem contradictory, or at least counterintuitive. I believe that we also need to create domestic institutions that are flexible enough to encourage
technology but can also impede certain kinds of knowledge when necessary. Mokyr alludes to this sort of argument when he refers to conservative resistance to some kinds of new technology. He targets
“well-meaning groups” who have felt that certain types of new technology, such as nuclear power or genetically modified crops, are undesirable.
I get the distinct impression that Mokyr regards this as an unproductive and misguided hindrance to what he views as the inevitable
economic benefits of new technology. (Perhaps this is because he refers
to such groups in the same sentence as the Frankfurt School, and it
seems clear that he doesn’t like them very much.)
Technology may be a public good in the abstract. In an economist’s
world, technology is always a public good because it increases productivity without an increased investment in labor. But the world of public policy requires the evaluation of particular technologies, the
dangers of which can sometimes outweigh the benefits. In these circumstances, the very institutions that Mokyr describes — institutions
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that are designed to further the commercial exploitation of technology
and the dissemination of that technology into individual hands — can
be a liability and not an asset.
I am thinking, in particular, of what are likely to be the most prominent technologies of this new century — genetics, nanotechnology, and
robotics (so-called “GNR” technologies). While these technologies
have the greatest economic potential, they also have the greatest
potential for mass-destructive effects.
In a recent article in Wired magazine, Bill Joy, the founder of Sun
Microsystems, wrote that GNR technology is too dangerous to be pursued.10 He is particularly concerned by the self-replicative capacity of
these technologies. A genetically modified organism with harmful
characteristics could “outcompete” natural systems. Self-replicating
nanotech robots running amok could cover the globe, destroying
everything in an endless cycle of replication (this scenario is known as
the “grey goo” effect).
This might all seem like science fiction, but the threat is real. These
technologies are right around the corner. We need to start thinking
about how to deal with them now. Bill Joy proposes what he
euphemistically calls “relinquishment,” a conscious political and scientific decision not to pursue certain kinds of knowledge. I think this is
misguided. These technologies will inevitably be developed, but they
must be controlled. How they will be controlled in the future depends
to a large degree on the legal institutions that we set up today.
The technologies of the last century that had mass-destruction
potential were nuclear, biological, and chemical in nature. Because of
their obvious military application, they were developed and controlled
largely by government institutions. Such technologies also require
sophisticated knowledge and expertise to use, further hampering their
dissemination. GNR technologies, on the other hand, are being developed in commercial laboratories precisely because of their significant
potential economic applications. The technology friendly institutions
that we have set up will put these technologies in the hands of individuals or small groups. Intentional misuse of these technologies — or
even an accident involving them — could have catastrophic consequences.
I do not propose that GNR technologies should be foregone or
“relinquished.” Instead, we must ensure that our institutions possess
the ability to put a check on headlong technological advance when
appropriate. One of the many potential ways to accomplish this would
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be to establish a licensing review for technologies with self-replicating
potential in order to ensure their safety and appropriate use. I don’t
pretend to know whether this particular proposal would be the best
solution or not, but it is certainly among those that we have to consider
if we are to address the real-world implications of technological
progress.
*****
In conclusion, technology friendly institutions may be desirable in certain circumstances. But even if it is appropriate for developing nations
to import Western-style institutions, such domestic reforms must be
accompanied by international institutional reform if they are to be at all
effective. In addition, our legal institutions should be engineered to
reflect a healthy skepticism regarding the most dangerous technologies of the future. The availability of technology is certainly a major
factor in economic power and well-being, and institutions undoubtedly play an indispensable role in technological progress. However, I
don’t think that the inevitable next step is the creation of institutions
designed to disseminate technology in all circumstances. Technology
is not always beneficial. It can be dangerous and may have profound
implications for the nature of human society. This should be kept in
mind as we consider the type of institutions that we want to create.
Notes
1. See J. W. Van Aalst, Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the World Statistics and Atlases
Website, available at http://worldatlas.brinkster.net/asp/terr.asp?terrid=65 (last visited November 17, 2002). It cites only 2,500 kilometers of paved roads in the DRC. By
comparison, South Africa has 137,480 kilometers of paved roads.
2. See Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (1996), for a powerful analysis of
what Castells calls “black holes” in the information economy.
3. See Andean Foreign Investment Code, 11 I.L.M. 126 (1972).
4. See Andean Foreign Investment Code, Article 20, 11 I.L.M 126, 133 (1972). Article 20
ensures that member states will not approve technology transfer contracts that contain
clauses imposing any of a list of obligations on the recipient country.
5. Ibid.
6. See David Frisch and Roy Bhala, Global Business Law: Principles and Practices (1999), pp.
889 – 90.
7. See General Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf (last visited
November 17, 2002).

72

David Tallman

8. Ibid.
9. For a discussion of microloans and globalization, see Kenneth Anderson, “Microcredit: Fulfilling or Belying the Universalist Morality of Global Markets?,” 5 Yale Human
Rights and Development Law Journal 85 (2002).
10. See Bill Joy, “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us,” Wired, Issue 8.04 (April 2000), available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy.html.
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